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A Re-Examination of the Law of
Homicide In 1971: The Model
Penal Code
By Roy MoRELAND*
The chaotic state of the law of homicide in Kentucky prior to
1960 was occasioned largely by the judicially-created crimes of
the felony wilful murder and the negligent voluntary manslaugh-
ter. As a result, in 1960 the Kentucky State Senate passed a
resolution directing the Legislative Research Commission [here-
inafter referred to as L.R.C.] to study homicide law in Kentucky.
This writer wrote a series of articles during the 1950's and 60's
studying Kentucky homicide law" and was a consultant in that
L.R.C. study. The Commission made its report to the legislature
in 1962, together with an appendix prepared by the writer
setting out a suggested homicide statute with comments2 from
the discussion in the Commission study group. A part of that
suggested statute pertaining to involuntary manslaughter was
adopted by the legislature in 1962 and is now KFXm rucK REvsED
STAT= [hereinafter referred to as KRS] § 435.022. The statute
eliminated the felony wilful murder and negligent voluntary man-
slaughter from Kentucky law.
The examination of homicide in Kentucky in this article is
occasioned by the belief that all law should be re-examined ap-
proximately every ten years and, more importantly, by the fact
* The late Mr. Moreland was Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Ken-
tucky College of Law; LL.B., University of Kentucky; J.D., University of Chicago;
S.J.D., Harvard University Law School. Au-moR's NoTE. Appreciation is expressed
to the writer's colleague, Professor Robert Lawson, who offered a number of sug-
gestions, particularly as to the interpretation of the Model Penal Code's treatment
of drunkenness and imperfect self-defense, and to Professor John Batt who offered
several criticisms, particularly as to the treatment of mental deficiency.
' These articles were Kentucky Felony Wilful Murder, 52 Ky. L.J. 585
(1964); Kentucky Homicide Law With Recommendations, 51 Ky. L.J. 59 (1962);
and A Suggested Homicide Statute for Kentucky, 41 Ky. L.J. 139 (1953).
2 
See LEGISLATIVE RESEARCI COMMISsION, REsEARC H REPORT No. 7, 18-20
(1961).
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that the Kentucky Crime Commission and the L.R.C. are ex-
amining Kentucky homicide law, as well as all other state sub-
stantive crimes with a view toward legislative recommendations.
The re-examination is occasioned also by a desire to consider a
third alternative punishment for intended murder; to consider
whether the negligent murder should be re-introduced into Ken-
tucky criminal law; to examine the various factors which reduce
intentional murder to voluntary manslaughter and to determine
if they should be specifically enunciated in the voluntary man-
slaughter statute; and finally, to consider whether "wantonly dis-
regardful" is the best phrase to describe the state of mind requisite
for the negligent homicide, whether it be on the level of murder
or involuntary manslaughter in the first degree. These purposes
will be approached by examining in turn the homicide law in
Kentucky.
I. MURDER
Probably the most sound and practical categorization of com-
mon law murder is the one promulgated nearly one hundred years
ago by Judge Stephen.' Certainly it is the one that is most fre-
quently cited.' He divided common law murder into four cate-
gories: the intentional murder, the negligent murder, the felony
murder, and the killing of an officer in the course of his official
duties.
A. Intentional Murder
Stephen's definition of the mental state requisite for intentional
murder is "an intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily
harm to, some person, whether such person is the person actually
killed or not."5 The definition includes the rule that if the intention
is to cause grievous bodily harm," but the result is the death of
the victim, it is nonetheless murder. This is because of the legal
principle that one intends the natural consequences of his acts.
A natural and probable consequence of a grievous wound is the
33 J. STEPHEN HISTORY OF THE CRIINAL LAW.v OF ENGLAND 80-81 (1883).4 For a Kentucfy case citing Stephen's analysis of murder, see Turner v. Com-
monwealth, 167 Ky. 365, 369, 180 S.W. 768, 770 (1915).
5 J. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 80-81.
6 See Professor Perkins' discussion of this type of "intentional" murder,
Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 552-55
(1934).
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death of the wounded person. The definition also includes a
situation where death was "substantially certain" to follow from
the act.7 This sounds much like the "extreme danger" found in
an "extremely negligent" murder but the category exists as a
type of "intentional" murder at common law. Intended murder
also includes the principle of "transferred intent." Thus, if A
intending to kill B fires at him but inadvertently kills C instead, it
is intentional murder. The "man-killing" intent which A has toward
B is thus transferred to C. These principles are spelled out in
Stephen's definition of common law intentional murder. How-
ever, it is not necessary nor desirable that these principles be
incorporated into a statute. They are continually being re-
examined by the courts and occasionally modified. To enumerate
them in a statute would "freeze" them in the law.
At common law there also is an inference of intent from a killing
occurring when a deadly weapon is involved in the commission
of a crime.8 This inference is subject to rebuttal, which is often
difficult, and the principle has occasioned sharp criticism9 but
is entrenched in the law.'0
Another common law inference of fact (sometimes called a
presumption of law) is that once it is proven that the defendant
committed the killing, an inference of intent arises from the act
of killing. This rule has been repudiated in England through
the decision in the Woolmington case." Woolmington was charged
with the murder of his estranged wife. The prosecution proved
that she was killed with a gun which the defendant had taken
into the house. The defendant was the only witness and claimed
that his wife was shot as they wrestled over the gun after he
had threatened to commit suicide. The trial judge charged the
jury that the defendant was guilty of murder unless he showed
that what happened was something less than intended murder,
thus putting the burden on him to rebut. He did not meet this
burden and was convicted as a result. The House of Lords quashed
7 Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HAIv. L. Rlv. 905, 910-11 (1939).
8 Note, 34 Ky. L.J. 224 (1946); Note, 35 Ky. L.J. 78 (1946). A number of
Kentucky cases are cited in these Notes.
9 See, e.g., REPORT OF LAw RE . COM. OF N.Y. 539, especially n. 36 (1937);
R. MowmAm, THE LAw OF HOMICIDE 30 (1952) [hereinafter cited as MonEAND].
1
0 See Note, 34 Ky. L.J. 320 (1946). A number of Kentucky cases are cited
in this note.
11 Woohnington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462.
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the conviction, thus eliminating the rule of many years standing
that intent will be inferred from the mere act of killing. The rule
is under similar attack in this country by the commentators and
in the cases and is on its way out of the law."-
These two inferences of intent are not included in Stephen's
definition of murder and the "freezing" of these inferences in a
statute would be most unfortunate. The courts should have an
opportunity to re-examine such common law principles while
statutes should be geared to fundamentals.
None of these common law principles are included in Ken-
tucky's present murder statute (KRS § 435.010, which simply
provides a punishment for "wilful" murder). Thus the question
is raised whether the common law crime of intended murder
has been substantially changed by the Kentucky legislature. The
answer is clear. While KRS § 435.010 prohibits "wilful murder,"
the Kentucky courts look to the common law for the definition
of this term.'3 But there are at least ten or twelve such definitions
and to include them in a statute would make for an unwieldy
and pedantic codification of some vague and medieval terms.
More importantly, these definitions are continually being re-
examined by the courts and modified 4 almost as often. Some of
them, for example, may be types of negligence of a high degree.
Again to enumerate them in an intentional murder statute would
be further unfortunate freezing of questionable principles into
the law of the state.
Thus, it is arguable that the Kentucky legislature was wise in
describing intentional murder by the bare phrase "wilful murder."
It would appear that no further definition is needed; the term
"wilful" is a dictionary word with a definite, accepted meaning.
Of course, it may be asked why the phrase "intentional murder"
was not used, since "intent" is also a dictionary word of accepted
meaning. But it is believed that "wilful" was used instead of
"intentional" for very good reasons. Intent in the law of murder
has had a variable interpretation. It will be remembered that in
12 See the critical note by Selby Hurst, Note 34 Ky. L.J. 806 (1946). See also
MoELN 21-24.
13 Commonwealth v. Illinois, 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913).
14 E.g., the current California statute includes the old common law examples
of the use of poison, torture and lying in wait to help define murder in the first
degree. The whole series o homicide statutes in that state is a conglomerate of
words and phrases. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189.
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the beginning all murder was a killing committed "with malice
aforethought." Gradually "aforethought" lost all meaning and
judges such as Stephen began to break down the various meanings
of malice, one of which was "intent." Finally, in an attempt to
provide a difference between a planned, intended murder and an
unplanned one, the word "premeditated" was introduced to
describe the planned killing and to distinguish it from an un-
planned one. The law was going through the same whittling
down process as it had with the word "aforethought," although
many statutes still use the term "premeditated" to try to help the
jury in determining punishment.
The difficulty the courts had in giving the word "intent" a
definite meaning in murder statutes is indicated by the use of
supplemental, descriptive words such as "deliberate" and "pur-
posely." For that reason, a statute which simply punished "in-
tended" murder would be subject to varying interpretations.
Kentucky has taken a different attack on the problem. Instead of
dividing murder into degrees by distinguishing between a pre-
meditated killing and one arising out of simple intent, Kentucky
has used a different word than intent, i.e., "wilful," and has given
the task to the jury to decide the punishment from the evidence.1?
There is, however, one problem in Kentucky's wilful murder
statute that should be corrected. The jury has only two choices
in the determination of punishment: death or life imprisonment.
The first may be thought too extreme by some jurors, the other
too lenient due to possible parole. There are many who do not
favor giving a death sentence under any circumstances. However,
a majority of Kentuckians think it should be continued. There was
a recent panel on the subject before the State Bar Association at its
annual meeting. The late Judge Morris Montgomery of the Court
of Appeals was the moderator and three circuit judges and the
writer composed the panel. The three circuit judges spoke in
favor of the abolition of the penalty. The writer urged that it be
retained for at least three offenses-killing a kidnapped person by
the kidnappers, the rape of a child under ten years of age, and
killing a peace officer in the course of his official duties. Judge
Montgomery spoke emotionally in favor of the penalty, saying
that during his time on the bench the Court had never affirmed
15 See the discussion in MoPamAND 196-212.
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a death sentence except in the case of a heinous, brutal killing for
which crime death is a proper punishment. Practically all of
those who spoke from the audience agreed with Judge Mont-
gomery. During Governor Breathitt's administration it was Judge
Montgomery who led the opposition to a determined drive, for the
abolishment of the death penalty in Kentucky. The legislature
refused to abolish it, and it is not likely to be abolished in the
state within the foreseeable future.
But many are strongly opposed to it. No one was executed in
Kentucky during Governor Breathitt's term of office. At the time
of this writing, more than ten convicted criminals occupy death
row in the state penitentiary at Eddyville. And yet a juryman
who would vote for the death penalty has little choice. His only
alternative is to vote for a life sentence. However, under the
present parole system in Kentucky, a defendant who receives a
life sentence is eligible for parole in six years, and it is well known
that many who receive life sentences serve these short periods of
imprisonment. Thus, a death sentence may be deemed too severe
while a life sentence, subject to parole in six years, may set out a
public outcry as too lenient. To remedy this unfortunate situation,
an editorial in the Louisville Courier Journal on February 16, 1960,
suggested a third alternative: confinement in the penitentiary for
fifteen years before becoming eligible for parole.
The writer recommends the present Kentucky intentional
murder statute with this additional alternative provision as to
punishment. The statute would then read:
Any person who commits willful murder shall be punished by
death, by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for a
minimum of fifteen years before becoming eligible for parole.
B. The Negligent Murder
The negligent murder is the second of Stephen's murder cate-
gories. Two problems exist in defining precisely the extent of this
type of murder. First, the degree of danger requisite for the crime
must be determined and secondly, the question of whether a
particular state of mind is required must be answered. Early
English cases and the classic common law treatises listed several
situations considered highly dangerous and sufficient to constitute
murder if an unintentional death occurred. Examples of such
1971]
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cases (usually given as illustrations in the early texts) include
shooting into a crowd, driving a horse into a crowd, and throwing
a beam or other object off a roof causing it to fall into a crowded
thoroughfare below.16 Modem examples of such extremely dan-
gerous acts include shooting into a train, into a dwelling house,
and into an automobile containing passengers." Other cases have
held these situations to support less than murder when a death
occurs.
The common law used various picturesque words and phrases
to describe the attitude of mind requisite for the negligent murder.
For example, the cases and early texts speak of a "depraved mind,
regardless of human life," and "a heart devoid of social duty and
fatally bent on mischief." This raises the question whether the
test of negligence in murder is objective or subjective. Stephen
took the position that it was subjective, that the accused must
have "knowledge of the danger."' Holmes, on the other hand,
in his book The Common Law 9 and in a series of cases in which
he wrote the opinions,2 ° was the leading advocate of the view that
the test is an objective one. The writer takes the position that
civil and criminal negligence including such negligence amounting
to murder are both objective. However, the same result is forth-
coming in virtually every case, regardless of which approach is
taken.2' If an ordinary prudent man would realize the extreme
danger in his act, it may be inferred that the defendant realized it,
unless he was drinking or suffering from some other mental
deficiency short of insanity.
However, to take the view that negligence on the murder level
is objective does not change the fact that the mental factor is a
sine qua non in the crime in virtually all cases. Not only did the
early cases and texts require "a wicked mind" or its equivalent,
but many statutes today embody the mental element specifically,
often in the very words of the common law. One could take the
view that if an ordinary prudent man would realize the extreme
16 See the discussion and citations, REPoRT OF LAW. Com. oF N.Y. 617, n. 237
(1937).
17 See the discussion and citations to cases, MORELAND 35, ns. 20-23.
18 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 3.
19 0. HormaEs, TE COMMON LAw 55-56 (1881).20 MorxLAN 37. Holmes' opinions and other text authority are cited in ns.
27 and 28.
21 See the discussion, id. at 26-41.
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danger, it may be inferred that the defendant recognized the
existence of that danger. That would make the offense wholly
objective. But, as suggested above, some defendants because of
drunkenness, sleepiness, or other mental condition might not
realize it at all. Suffice it to say, that in such cases juries and courts,
albeit through often cloudy reasoning, generally hold the accused
realized the danger existed.22 This being true, perhaps it would
be better if the courts frankly took Holmes' view and thus were
able to hold the accused responsible regardless of his mental at-
titude.
Undoubtedly the mental attitude is still important in the
negligent murder. In most cases involving extreme danger it may
be satisfied by raising a factual inference of knowledge of the
extreme danger. Even in cases where this is doubtful because
of the accused's mental condition, the courts find it by devious
reasoning. Courts generally refuse to let a defendant escape
responsibility because of drunkenness or other mental condition
which he, himself, caused.
The issue can be raised directly by asking whether a negligent
murder statute would correctly describe the crime if it covered
death occurring unintentionally because the accused was doing
an extremely dangerous act. It is submitted that it would not
under most decisions, due largely to the fact that the law, with
rare exception, requires mens rea in all criminal cases. Of course,
extreme negligence shows a blameworthy state of mind, so the
mens rea requirement is satisfied without a stretching of reason-
ing. At any rate, it would appear that the ancient concept of
depravity still must be satisfied in a statutory definition of negli-
gent murder. In interpreting that statute the court may speak
largely of "depraved conduct" but there can be no doubt that an
inference of a blameworthy, anti-social state of mind must be
preserved. Holmes went further than the statutes and law of his
time and a complete repudiation of the attitude of mind, and a
conviction based wholly on conduct would still go beyond the
law of today. That being true, the mental attitude must be satis-
fied in drawing a negligent murder statute even today. It must
22 For example, in cases of drunkenness, the courts ordinarily hold the accused
had knowledge of the danger if he was able to drive a car and an ordinary
prudent man would have realized it. See the discussion id. at 38-40.
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appear specifically in the statute or from a reasonable interpre-
tation of the statute by the courts.
It follows, then, that both the extreme danger created by the
defendant's act as well as his mental attitude must be included in
a negligent murder statute. The danger required in the act
presents little problem-it can be satisfied by saying "by an act
extremely dangerous to human life," or similar language. But the
mental attitude phase of the description presents a more -difficult
problem. Of course, one may satisfy the requirement by using one
of the picturesque words or phrases found in the common law.
Thus, the statute could state "if by an extremely dangerous act,
evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life." New York
and some other states still use that phrase in their negligent murder
statutes.2" But "depraved" is a Sunday word with a distinct moral
connotation. Similar objection can be made to the phrase "with
an abandoned and malignant heart" found in other statutes.24 In
some fourteen or so states the statutes provide that certain homi-
cides shall be murder in the second degree. In such jurisdictions
the tests for the negligent murder are the same as they were at
common law.25 The same interpretation will be true in those
states which use "implied malice" to define the crime. The net
result is that most jurisdictions describe the crime in terms of the
common law. "A depraved mind," "a malignant heart," and "with
malice aforethought" are all historic survivors and will be given
a common law interpretation.
If, then, the common law and historic survivor statutory
phrases are not satisfactory2 6 to describe the mental attitude
requisite for the negligent murder, since all are outmoded and
ambiguous, what other descriptive words or phrases can be used?
The Model Penal Code suggests the phrase "committed recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life."27 The word "recklessly" is unfortunate here
for it is the same word used by the Model Code in defining negli-
23 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE § 125.25 where the new New York statute
uses the phrase "depraved indifference."
24 For examples, see MonEAND 214.
25 Id. at 215.
26 The words and phrases used in statutes in various states may be found listed
and categorized in MonELAND 213-25.
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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gence on the manslaughter level,28 but the phrase "extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life" is equivalent to the "depraved
mind" and other mental attitude phrases of the common law.
The writer, faced with the problem in 1962 of selecting a suitable
phrase to describe this attitude of mind in drafting the Kentucky
statute on negligent manslaughter in the first degree (the equiva-
lent of common law negligent murder), used the phrase "wanton
disregard of human life and safety."29 The phrase "wanton dis-
regard of human life" is equivalent to the anti-social requirement
found in common law negligent murder and current statutes as
well.
The writer feels that the mental attitude of one who is
"wantonly disregardful of" (wantonly indifferent to) human life
and safety is satisfactorily understandable, but there are those
who claim that the meaning of the word "wanton" is ambiguous.
One of the dictionary phrases used to describe "wanton" is
"arrogant recklessness." The word "arrogant" is a rather strong
one, but it hardly affords the connotation of the attitude required
for the negligent murder. It is also unfortunate to use the word
"reckless" with the word "wanton," since "recklessness" is the
key word for the negligent homicide on the manslaughter level.
If the writer correctly interprets the attitude of the common law,
one who commits a negligent murder has the mental attitude,
"I don't give a damn if I do kill somebody by my extremely
dangerous act."30 Of course, one cannot put that language into a
statute, or hardly into an opinion or rule, but it illustrates the
point. The phrase "wanton disregard" (or extreme indifference
for) the lives and safety of others is the most satisfying one to
describe the mental attitude of a person who would be guilty of
placing others in such extremely dangerous situations. If that
phrase were used the statute might read:
281d. at § 201.3(1)(a).
29 See Ky. REv. STAT. Lhereinafter cited as KRS] § 435.022(1).
3o "A... hunter shoots through a farm house with a high power rifle. He is
not trying to hit anyone for he has no idea in what part of the building the
occupants may be, but it is quite immaterial to him whether anyone is killed,
injured, frightened, or not. The hunter is acting with a wanton and willful dis-
regard of an obvious human risk and hence has malice aforethought . . R.
PEuRNs, CRIMINAL LAW 670 (1957). See Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 165 211
S.W. 217 (1919); Commonwealth v. Malone, 854 Pa. 180, 47 A.2d 445 (19465.
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Any person who causes the death of a human being by an act
creating such extreme risk of death or great bodily injury as
to manifest a wanton indifference to the value of human life
under the circumstances shall be guilty of murder in the
second degree and shall be confined in the penitentiary for
not less than one nor more than fifteen years.31 [Term of
punishment purely suggestive.]
First Alternate Statute
Is it possible to draft a negligent murder statute which would
satisfy those who do not believe the word "wanton" should be
used in the above statute? Any substitute for "wanton indiffer-
ence" should not involve the word "recklessly", a term which ap-
pears in both the negligent manslaughter and negligent murder pro-
visions of the Model Penal Code, 2 but should be reserved solely
for the description of the negligent manslaughter since the word
does not give the connotation requisite for the negligent murder;
the "don't give a damn if I do kill somebody by my dangerous act"
attitude. Similarly to add an adverb to the word "reckless" and
make the phrase "extremely reckless" simply would not raise a
connotation of the "depraved" mind required. In addition, if the
same word is used in describing both the negligent murder and
the negligent manslaughter, judges and juries would have a most
difficult time distinguishing the two. The use of the adverb
"extremely" or some other word to distinguish the two would not
be too helpful in providing accuracy. When does "reckless"
become "extremely reckless?" It is like drawing the weight line
between a "big bear" and an "extremely big bear."
If, then, the word "wanton" does not appeal to the drafter
of a negligent murder statute, the following statute, based in
part on the Model Penal Code, section 201.2(1) (b) might be
used:
Any person who causes the death of a human being by an act
creating such a very high risk of death or serious bodily harm
as to indicate under the circumstances extreme indifference to
the value of human life shall be confined in the penitentiary
31 Compare KIS § 435.022(1).3 2
MODEL PFNAL CODE § § 201.2 (1) (b) and 201.3 (1) (a).
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for not less than one year nor more than fifteen years. [Term
of punishment purely suggestive.]
Does this statute satisfy both the very high degree of danger
and the reprehensible state of mind required under the common
law? It is believed that it does. Of course, to reach that conclu-
sion, it may be necessary to interpret the phrase "as to indicate
under the circumstances extreme indifference to the value of
human life" as an "inference of fact" from the act creating a very
high risk of life. This creates an inference of the fact of the state
of mind, required by the common law, from the circumstances.
Second Alternative Statute
It is further submitted that the requirement of a blameworthy
state of mind in the defendant which still exists today in the
majority of cases, in the statutes, and in the recommended pro-
visions of the Model Penal Code, could be eliminated and the
standard made admittedly objective by a slight rewording of the
above statute.
Any person who causes the death of a human being by an act
creating such a very high risk of death or serious bodily harm
as to indicate under the circumstances extreme indifference to
the value of human life, according to the standard of a reason-
able man, shall be confined in the penitentiary (for not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years). [Term of punish-
ment purely suggestive.]
Under this statute the standard is not the defendant but a
reasonable man under the circumstances. The cases indicate
there has been no subjective determination of the defendant's
mental attitude anyway. Juries under the "depraved mind"
approach have been inferring defendant's attitude from the cir-
cumstances surrounding the case. 3 What has been the standard
in such interpretation? The jury. The juror is asked whether he
had an attitude of extreme indifference. He answers that question
by asking himself whether from his own interpretation of the
circumstances he concludes there is an inference of the fact of
,,See, eg Mueller, "The Devil May Care"-Or Should We? A Re-examina-
tion of Crim inaNegligence, 55 Ky. L.J. 29, 34 (1966).
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extreme indifference. If the jury fails to find an inference of fact
of extreme indifference, it may conclude there is an inference of
fact of recklessness and that the defendant is therefore guilty of
manslaughter.
All this, as a matter of theory, is an objective determination
of a subjective fact by an inference of fact as to the defendant's
attitude of mind. But the objective determination is made by
the jury, who consider themselves to be reasonable men. Thus
the final result is the same as it would be if the standard were
admittedly objective.
Nor have the courts faced the issue of inadvertent negligence
in discussing the inference of fact. For example, in cases of
drunkenness the courts almost invariably affirm a conviction,
saying if the defendant was able to drive a car he was able to
know the danger. This may well be an overstatement. The gist
of the matter is that juries and courts are unwilling to let inad-
vertence, resulting from the defendant's own activity or omission,
serve as a defense in cases of drunkenness, sleepiness, fatigue, etc.
Of course, such finding of fact of mental competence should be
rebuttable under a subjective standard by an affirmative showing
of mental incapacity because the act was inadvertent. But as one
reads the cases, effective rebuttal simply does not appear. The
writer made a somewhat detailed analysis of drunkenness cases 34
and found that the courts generally do not refuse to affirm con-
victions because of inadvertence. It is suspected that juries and
courts do not look with favor on that kind of rebuttal. After all,
it is bad policy to allow one who drives while drinking or sleepy
to escape criminal responsibility on the technicality that his
negligence was inadvertent.
One should not be too severe with the courts in resorting to
the evidentiary device of inference of fact. However, they can
and should be blamed for insisting on a subjective standard and
then applying what in effect is an objective one. It is highly
arguable that the courts in the negligent murder should stop pay-
ing lip service to subjectivity, when it is clear that their standard





There is no reason why the test should not be objective. In the
first place, as to inadvertence and mens rea, the standard applied
is in reality objective already. The writer is no friend of "liability
without fault," but one can be at fault if judged by the standard
of a reasonable man. One must meet community standards as to
mental attitudes when coupled with dangerous acts, otherwise he
has mens rea. In the ordinary case of inadvertence because of
drunkenness, etc. where the defendant is at fault because he
created his mental condition, he may be said to have mens rea.
If one is just plain "dumb", the problem is more difficult. When
one considers the number of serious crimes by those who
are sort of mental "kooks" he will consider that the concept of
mens rea needs a broadened definition, one that will give more
social security. Sirhan Sirhan admittedly has a muddled mind.
Yet the jury found him guilty of the "intentionar' murder of Robert
Kennedy. Perhaps the time has come for a restated substantive
definition of mens rea so that the legal rule, as well as the jury,
can provide community protection.
The question of whether negligence on the murder level
should be objective is being increasingly discussed. The majority
of cases, texts, statutes, and the Model Penal Code take the view
that it is subjective because if it were objective, there would be
no mens rea in cases of inadvertence. Mueller,35, Perkins,36 and
Collings37 faced the problem frankly in recent articles, citing cases
and texts pro and con, and concluded that cases of inadvertence
force a subjective standard. Perkins went so far as to conclude
that negligence in murder is different in kind from negligence and
belongs under the label of "malice."
The writer has argued for years that negligence on the murder,
as well as on other levels, should be objective 38 and there is
respectable authority for that position, quite notably Holmes.39
Justin Miller and May's Criminal Law40 are in accord. Various
35 Mueller, supra note 33.30Perkns, Alignment of Sanction with Culpable Conduct, 49 IowA L.J. 325
(1964).
37 Collings, Negligent Murder-Some Stateside Footnotes to Director of Pub-
lic Prosecutions v. Smith, 49 CALIF. L. Bnv. 254 (1961).
38 See, e.g., MoRELAND 36.
39 0. HOL.MES, supra note 19, at 55-56. See listing of his opinions taking that
view, MoRtEND 37, n. 27.
40J. MILLER, CrIMNAL LAw 268 (1934); K. SE.ns & H. WhmorNms, MAY's
CI mA.L LAw, § 27 (4th ed. 1938).
1971]
KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL
commentators support the objective standard, citing American
cases.41 A leading American case is Commonwealth v. Welan-
sky,' where the Massachusetts court said:
[E]ven if a particular defendant is so stupid [or] so heedless
... that in fact he did not realize the grave danger, he cannot
escape the imputation of wanton or reckless conduct in his
dangerous act or omission, if an ordinary normal man under
the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of
the danger. A man may be reckless within the meaning of the
law although he himself thought he was careful.43
The objective standard is used in the section on "Negligent Homi-
cide" in the Model Penal Code,44 although the subjective standard
is employed in the other sections on Negligence.
One problem remains. Since 1962 when KRS § 435.022(1)
was adopted, there has been no negligent murder in Kentucky.
The question arises whether the crime should be re-introduced
in the state or whether that which would otherwise be punished
as a negligent murder should continue to be penalized as involun-
tary manslaughter in the first degree under that statute. The
suggested answer to that question will be deferred until the gen-
eral discussion on Involuntary Manslaughter, infra.
C. The Felony Murder
Stephen's third category in the categorization of murder at
common law by the requisite states of mind is the felony murder.
41 Note, The Negligent Murder, 28 Ky. L.J. 53 (1947); Note, Should the
Objective Test be Applied in Negligent Murder Cases, 35 Ky. L.J. 242 (1947).
The social purpose underlying the requirement of compensation to
the person harmed is not identical with that which forms the basis of
punishment. Conceivably, therefore, the standard adopted in the criminal
aw of negligence might be entirely different from that used in the civil
cases. This is not exactly the answer since the "measuring stick" here,
as well as there, is the conduct of a reasonable man under like circum-
stances. But whereas the civil law required conformity to this standard,
a very substantial deviation is essential to criminal guilt. Perkins, A
Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HAnv. L. REv. 914-915 (1943).
This is apparently contrary to his view as expressed elsewhere; for example, in
the article cited supra, at note 36.
42 [I]f the *uy come to the conclusion that any reasonable person, that is to
say a person who cannot set up a plea of insanity, must have known that what
he was doing would cause at least grievous bodily harm and the death is the
result of that grievous bodily harm, then that amounts to murder...." Regina v.
Ward [1956] 1 Q.B. 351, 356 (C.C.A.).
43 Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (1944).44
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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If an unlawful killing occurred in the commission of a felony it
was murder. The doctrine was under repeated attack 5 because
of its harshness, but it was not until the memorable decision of
Judge Stephen in Regina v. Serne46 in 1887 that it was definitely
determined that the felony in the course of which the killing
occurred must be one dangerous to life and likely in itself to cause
death. Notice that Stephen's statement of the rule is worded in
substantially the same language as that used in the negligent
murder. Making the point even more clear, the opinion goes on
to state that the intent to commit a felony is not enough unless the
felony in itself is of such a kind as to show an act in committing
it that will endanger life or cause bodily harm.
The 1957 English Homicide Act expressly abolished the
felony murder rule in England." This is the logical and proper
way to handle the felony murder, especially in light of Regina v.
Serne. And yet, although abolished in England, and although it
should be abolished in this country by statute or under the
reasoning in Regina v. Serne, that is not what has happened.
Instead, it lingers on in what may well be called transition statutes.
These statutes have attempted to reduce the harshness of the
common law doctrine by limiting the felonies applicable, usually
to four. Some thirteen states classify homicides committed in
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of arson, rape, rob-
bery, and burglary as murder in the first degree or as simple
murder where murder is not divided into degrees. Statutes in
several states add to the above four the offenses of mayhem,
kidnapping, or larceny. On the other hand, some statutes codify
the common law making the statute apply "to any felony." Other
statutes are varied.48 The Model Penal Code 9 continues the
transition feature, adding two or three felonies, and raising a
presumption of "recklessness and violence," if a killing is com-
mitted in the commission or attempt to commit any of these
felonies. To one who is no friend of "presumptions of law," the
device in the Model Code appears as an attempt to preserve a
portion of the historic survivor, the felony murder rule. Taken
4 5 MoRELAirs 42.
4616 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 313 (1887).
47 5& 6 Eliz. 2 c. 11 (1957).48 An attempte categorization of such statutes is in Monw.tN 217.
4 9 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2(1) (b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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as a compromise, as a transition statute, it may well serve a
temporary purpose. It would be better to abolish the felony
murder rule and prosecute such killings as negligent murders.
Then if the fact was that the killing was committed in the com-
mission of a felony, the determining factors would be the amount
of danger in the act and the indifference to human life and safety
shown in its perpetration.
D. Killing An Officer In The Course Of His Official Duties
The fourth category in Stephen's analysis of murder embodied
cases where an officer was unintentionally killed by the defendant
while in the commission of his official duties. This category,
developed as a protection of law officers, has passed from the law
as a separate category. Like the felony murder, guilt may occur
only if the act in the commission of which an officer was killed
was extremely dangerous in itself and showed an extreme indiffer-
ence to human life and safety. Thus, these cases too are now
handled as negligent murders.50 There is no value in laboring
the discussion as the doctrine, never very entrenched in the law,
is at last, as Livingston Hall points out, "non-existent."51
II. MANSLAUGHTER
A. Voluntary Manslaughter
Voluntary manslaughter at common law is generally said to
be an unlawful homicide resulting from an intention to kill or do
serious bodily harm to another which would be murder except
for extenuating circumstances. 52 The law recognizes that such
"provocation" as might raise "heat of passion" in a reasonable man
may serve as such a mitigating agent. In such cases the law
could, since the killing is intentional, hold the accused guilty of
murder. On the other hand, it might excuse him because of the
extenuating circumstances. However, the present law takes an
intermediate compromise position and holds the accused guilty
50 MORELAND 59.
51 Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes-1887-1936, 50 H1ALv. L. REv. 616,
642 (1937); Perkins, Alignment of Sanction Culpable Conduct, 49 IowA L. 1REv.
365, n. 248 (1964).




of voluntary manslaughter. A reasonable man should not kill
under such circumstances, but occasionally, when overcome by
emotion some do kill, and the law recognizing this frailty of
human nature, reduces the offense if in fact the defendant was
filled with heat of passion.53 The primary problem in a study of
voluntary manslaughter, then, is to determine what are the
exceptional circumstances which the common law has determined
justify such a reduction and whether the same circumstances
should serve as reducing agents today.
The common law recognized four and, in general, only four,
situations of provocation which would reduce an intentional mur-
der to involuntary manslaughter,54 although there are a few cases
where other circumstances were deemed sufficient.5 These four
situations constituting provocation are: (1) sudden, mutual com-
bat, (2) the sight of adultery of one's wife, (3) an assault and
battery upon one's person, and (4) an illegal arrest. Many con-
sidered the four recognized classic situations as too narrowly
limiting what may raise sufficient "heat of passion" to reduce
intentional murder to voluntary manslaughter. For example,
words, no matter how approbatous, would not serve as such a
reducing agent.5" Thus, in Freddo v. State,5 7 the defendant killed
a fellow employee who called him a "son of a bitch." It was
held that this would not reduce the offense to manslaughter.
5
Nor are gestures, however vile, sufficient. The deceased com-
mitted sodomy upon the defendant and told friends of the act.
They made insulting gestures and the defendant killed the
deceased. It was held the gestures, particularly when made some
time after the occurrence, were not enough to reduce the killing
to manslaughter.59
5
3 The test of provocation is an objective one (the reasonable man) but if in
fact the defendant, subjectively speaking, was not filled with the heat of passion,
there is no reduction. So the law catches the defendant coming and going. See,
e.g., Davidson v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 451, 187 S.E. 437 (1936).
54 For a detailed discussion of these four situations see MO.ELAND 69-87.
55 R. P1mENs, CrnammAL LAw 64 (2d ed. 1969).
56 Id. at 61.
57 127 Tenn. 376, 155 S.W. 170 (1912).
58 h defendant in this case was highly incensed. The judge recommended
that the Governor exercise clemency. And yet some people, "talk like that,"
wvithout meaning the phrase in its literal sense. One remembers' the application of
the phrase by President Harry Truman to one who had criticized his daughter's




The somewhat limited categories of provocation outlined
above were broadened by the English Homicide Act of 1957,60
which provided that the question of whether the provocation was
enough to cause a reasonable man to lose his self-control should
be left to the jury. The jury was to take into account everything
both done and said in determining the question. This statute was
embodied in the Model Penal Code in slightly modified language:
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
(b) A homicide which would otherwise be murder is commit-
ted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance for which there is reasonableness or excuse. The reason-
ableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under
the circumstances as he believes them to be.61
This broad definition of provocation is subjective; it is viewed
from the actor's viewpoint under the circumstances as he be-
lieves them to be. However, his extreme mental or emotional
disturbance must be "reasonable" in the eyes of the jury. This
approach would seem best when all the circumstances are con-
sidered.
It is commonly said that the crime of intentional unlawful
killing may be reduced to voluntary manslaughter solely by
provocation.62 This is inaccurate, since several circumstances
other than provocation have been held to reduce the offense.
These situations are (1) the mental deficiency of the accused,
(2) cases involving an imperfect defense of self or of another
person, or of habitation, and (3) drunkenness.
In Kentucky, there are several cases holding that mental
deficiency (diminished capacity) will reduce an intentional homi-
cide to manslaughter on the ground that the deficiency prevents
the accused from having the "intent" (malice) requisite for
intentional murder.64 It would appear that the current test of
insanity in Kentucky and in many other states as well, is so broad
60 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 3.
61 MODEL PENAL. CODE: § 201.3(1) (b) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
! 2Note Are There Circumstances Other Than Provocation Which May "Re-
duce Murder to Voluntary Manslaughter?, 36 Ky. L.J. 443 (1948).
63See generally Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law With Recommendations,
51 Ky. L.J. 59, 87-97 (1962).64 Mangrum v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 94, 95, 39 S.W. 703, 704
(1897); Rogers v. Commonwealth, 96 Ky. 24, 27 S.W. 813 (1894).
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that the "mental deficiency" rule of reduction is no longer needed
for that purpose. The current test65 is whether the defendant at
the time he committed the act did not have substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or if he did
understand it, to resist the impulse to violate the law. In either
case his conduct must have been the result of mental disease or
defect. One who has some "mental deficiency" may well be said
to come within the ambit of "mental defect." However, to find
the defendant insane under the present Kentucky rule would
result in complete acquittal. On the other hand, a finding of
"cmental deficiency" would result in a verdict of voluntary man-
slaughter, which would subject the defendant to a limited pun-
ishment. Thus, it may be argued that mental deficiency as a
reducing agent should be continued for that reason.
The Model Penal Code provides that evidence of "mental
disease or defect" may be introduced to show that defendant did
or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense.
An alternate provision provides that, in jurisdictions having the
death penalty, evidence of "mental disease or defect" may be
introduced as ground for mitigation of punishment.66 It is sub-
mitted that both provisions are ambiguous, as to the net result of
such evidence. Also, why should a distinction be made as to
capital offenses? The rule that such evidence may serve to
reduce the offense from first to second degree murder or to
voluntary manslaughter would seem more satisfactory. In Ken-
tucky, which does not divide murder into degrees, the offense
would be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. Note the provisions
are stated in terms of "mental disease or defect," instead of
'mental deficiency," to correlate with the Model Code definition
of "insanity."
Imperfect defense of self, or of another person, or of habitation
is well recognized in the common law as a reducing agent. These
situations occur where the accused would be entitled to plead
self-defense if he had not been at fault in bringing on the difficulty
which resulted in the homicide.6 Also included in the imperfect
self-defense category are those cases in which the slayer er-
65 Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963).
66 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 402 (1) and (2) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
67 Note, Criminal Law-Imperfect Self-Defense, 37 Ky. L.J. 334 (1948).
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roneously and unreasonably believed that his life or the life of
another was in danger or in which the accused used greater force
than was reasonably necessary.0 8 Some of these cases expressly
state that heat of passion is not always necessary to make out the
offense of voluntary manslaughter.6 9
Under the Model Penal Code, when the actor believes that
the force he employs is necessary for his self-defense, his belief
entitles him to justification although his belief is erroneous,
except when he acts "recklessly,70 recklessly only,71 or with
criminal negligence." These situations would then be murder,
manslaughter, or criminal negligence respectively under the
Model code. The actor should not have the benefit of the various
grades of mitigation in such cases if his use of force under the
circumstances was such a substantial deviation from the standard
of care that would be exercised by a reasonable man under the
circumstances as to continue either of the three grades of criminal
carelessness. 3
The Model Penal Code follows the common law that volun-
tary intoxication is no defense to crime.74 However, intoxication
that negates the accused's capacity to form the culpable mental
state essential to the commission of the crime may serve as a de-
fense because the prosecution cannot make out a requisite element
of the offense. Thus, evidence of intoxication may be adduced to
disprove the "intent" required for the offense. For example,
larceny requires the specific "intent to take, carry away, and
permanently appropriate to one's own use," but an intoxicated
person may not have such specific intent.75
But many crimes do not require specific intent. Thus, while
an intoxicated person cannot be guilty of larceny, he may be guilty
of a homicide requiring only "general intent." A defendant who
was intoxicated at the time of the act can be guilty of the "reck-
08 See 2 W. Bunic, THE LAW OF CDIM § 461 (1946); Note, Criminal Law
-Imperfect Self-Defense, 37 Kyr. L.. 334, 337' (1948).
O9Note, supra note 62 at 447.70 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (a) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
71 MODEN PELN CODE § 210.2(1) (b) and Comment (Proposed Off. Draft,
1962)j MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962); MODEL PENAL
CODE: § 210.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
73 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
74 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Off. Draft, 1962).
75 Id. at 2.08(1).
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lessness" required for voluntary manslaughter. However, he can-
not be convicted of "premeditated" murder, or even "intentional"
murder. So, while intoxication is not a defense to crime, it may




An involuntary manslaughter is the unintended unlawful
killing of a human being. Modem texts classify such killings
under the broad heading of negligence. A major problem in a
discussion of this category is whether the most wanton and
extremely negligent of these homicides should be classified as
negligent murder or as involuntary manslaughter in the highest
degree. Another equally difficult problem is the wording of the
statute defining the offense.
The definition which appears in K.RS § 435.022(1) was the
result of a study by the Legislative Research Commission in the
early sixties. It reads as follows:
Any person who causes the death of a human being by an act
creating such extreme risk of death or great bodily injury as to
manifest a wanton indifference to the value of human life ac-
cording to the standard of conduct of a reasonable man under
the circumstances shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter
in the first degree and shall be confined in the penitentiary for
not less than one nor more than fifteen years.
There are those members of both bar and bench who question
the use of the word "wanton" in this definition as ambiguous.
This term is being employed increasingly by the courts, however,
primarily in connection with another word or phrase77 as a part
of the definition of the negligent murder.
The use of the word "wanton" would seem appropriate in the
construction of a statute. It is singularly appropriate to describe
the attitude of mind of the individual who commits an extremely
dangerous act and who, although there is no intention to kill, is
indifferent as to whether death or serious bodily harm result. The
761d. at 2.08(2).
77 E.g., Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. App. 382, 384, 85 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1955)
("will or wanton disregard"); People v. Brucato, 32 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (Sup. Ct.
1942) ("reckless or wanton disregard").
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Model Penal Code builds its definition on the use of "recklessness"
indicating extreme indifference under the circumstances." But
the word "reckless" is used in the Model Code's definition of the
negligent homicide on the manslaughter level,79 which naturally
causes confusion since the shades of meaning differ in each of the
two grades of negligence.
Faced with some doubt as to the clarity of meaning of the
word "wanton" and not desiring to use the word "reckless,"
which is a part of the definition on a lower homicide level, the
writer has cast about for another definition, more acceptable,
perhaps, than either the one in KRS § 435.022(1) or the one in
the Model Penal Code employing the word "recklessly."
80
One solution has been suggested by Gerhard Mueller,8' who
suggests that the proper connotative result might be achieved by
omitting the use of any word, whether it be recklessly, wanton,
or some other term. The Model Code hints at this possibility by
stating in the Comments that the conception the draft employs
is that of "extreme indifference to the value of human life."8 -
Professor Wechsler, the Chief Reporter for the Model Penal Code,
made a similar suggestion in proposing revisions to the Illinois
Criminal Code several years ago. It was his recommendation that
the actor should be guilty of a negligent murder when the death
is the result of an act "which is utterly disregardful of the con-
sequences."3 If the descriptive word were thus omitted, the
definition could then be worded to state that a negligent homicide
would be murder when the death was the result of an extremely
dangerous act and indicating under all the circumstances extreme
indifference to human life and safety. Thus, the two elements
would be satisfied: an extremely dangerous act and an indication
under all the circumstances of extreme indifference to human life
and safety. The circumstances might include the fact that the
actor was driving while drinking heavily, that he was driving at
high speed, that he had run several lights before the accident,
78 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 and Comments (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
79 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.8 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).8OSee MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2(l)(b)(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
81 In a letter to the author.
82 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2(1) (b) Comment at 29 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
Wechslr, Proposed Revisions in the Illinois Criminal Code, 48 Nw. U.L.
REv. 198, 218 (1953).
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and that he was impudent and truculent at the time of the arrest.
It is believed that such a definition is fully descriptive of the
requisites of the negligent murder. Of course, the same problem
exists here as in the case of the use of the word "wanton." Would
a jury or a judge know any better what is extreme indifference
than what is wanton disregard? Such discussion illustrates the
limitations of either words or phrases to portray exact meaning.
Perhaps the use of phrases to describe the kind of act and
attitude of mind requisite in the crime rather than the use of
wanton is better because, while the word "wanton" is connotative
of the type of person who would be guilty of such an act, the
question is whether it is connotative to the average person in
terms of negligence.
If, then, the use of the word "wanton" does not appeal to the
drafter of a negligent murder statute and he prefers to use descrip-
tive phrases to describe the offense, the following statute, modeled
in part on the Model Penal Code, section 201.2(1) (b) might be
used:
Any person who causes the death of a human being by an act
creating such a very high risk of death or serious bodily harm
as to indicate under the circumstances, extreme indifference to
the value of human life shall be confined in the penitentiary
for not less than one nor more than fifteen years. (Term of
punishment purely suggestive.)
This is the First Alternative Statute discussed in the text on
the negligent murder, supra.
1. Involuntary Manslaughter In The First Degree
The above discussion of negligent murder raised but did not
resolve the question whether a negligent homicide arising out
of an extremely dangerous act and an attitude of wanton disre-
gard for human life and safety, should be punished as a negligent
murder or as involuntary manslaughter in the first degree. It is
the position of this writer that such a homicide should be involun-
tary manslaughter in the first degree. A number of commentators
have also repudiated the concept of the negligent murder. For
example, Rex Collings, a Professor of Law at the University of




By now it is no secret that I am firmly opposed to the "negli-
gent murder" and the American equivalent, the "abandoned
and malignant heart....-84
Collings suggests that in such cases the defendant under Ameri-
can Law can be convicted of involuntary manslaughter, if the
negligent murder is repudiated. But he is also somewhat dubious
as to whether manslaughter is not also indefensible, stating that
lesser offenses such as reckless driving while intoxicated could
apply. 5 Collings has trouble with the problem of mens rea.
There is no great difficulty in satisfying the technicality of
maens rea; the objection to the negligent murder is not technical
but practical. Juries are loath to convict defendants on charges
of negligent murder and, when they do, appellate courts are in-
clined to reverse the conviction. An examination of the cases
noted in the American Digest System over the past twenty-five
years reveals a few cases where the defendant was convicted of
the offense. It may be argued that it is wise to keep the crime
on the statute books in order to cover such cases. However, if the
proper result were reached in the particular case, it might have
been achieved by the application of some other doctrine, such as
for example, that death was "practically certain" to result from
such a dangerous act.
One must also take cognizance of the fact that the negligent
murder is an old and well established concept and that it is
included in the new Model Code of the American Law Institute
and in the new English Homicide Act. Historic survivors are
difficult to weed out of the law. When this writer began a study
of homicide law forty-five years ago, malice aforethought, the
felony murder, and murder occasioned by the killing of an officer
in the course of his official duties were all embedded in the law.
Today they have all been re-rationalized and modified, as have
many other concepts. The law is continually changing, especially
in the direction of becoming more lenient and humane. It pains
modem students and practitioners to convict an individual of
murder for an unintentional killing even though it was the result
of negligent conduct.
Other approaches are available. The punishment for an unin-
84 Collings, supra note 37, at 285.
85 Id. at 286.
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tentional, negligent murder is ordinarily life imprisonment. In
Kentucky, an individual who has been given a life sentence is
eligible to seek a parole in six years. The punishment for man-
slaughter in the first degree is ordinarily fifteen to twenty years.
The maximum punishment for involuntary manslaughter in the
first degree (an offense which carries the same definition as a
negligent murder) carries a maximum punishment of fifteen years
in Kentucky. One is eligible to seek parole in four years.8 There
is a potential two year difference in the time to be served but any
such inconsistency may easily be ironed out. The point is that as
far as actual punishment is concerned, there need be no great
difference between a life sentence for negligent murder and a
fifteen year sentence for involuntary manslaughter in the first
degree. Any difference is adjustable.
The reluctance to convict of murder one who kills another
unintentionally through his negligent conduct is illustrated by the
experience of the study group which studied the entire subject
of homicide under a resolution of the Kentucky Senate in 1960.
When the question arose as to whether the negligent murder
should be incorporated into the Kentucky law of homicide, that
group voted four to one against the suggestion. It was the opinion
of the majority of the group that murder was too harsh a penalty
for an unintended killing by negligence even in cases where the
negligence could be termed extreme.
Indeed, when what would have been the negligent murder
provision was incorporated by the study group into the involun-
tary manslaughter provision in the first degree in the identical
language and passed by the legislature in 1962, it was seven years
before a conviction under that provision reached the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. In the first case, Fugate v. Commonwealth,7 the
Court reversed the conviction. Justices Osborn and Neikirk dis-
sented. The defendant in the case was driving a pick-up without
lights at dusk on a winding road at a speed of 40 to 45 miles an
hour. There was evidence that he had been drinldng. He struck
the deceased who was about three feet "beside" the road, dragged
the body about 25 to 80 feet without leaving skid marks, and went
on without stopping. On the following day he attempted to hire
8OKentucICy Institution Regulation 6 (1966).
87445 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. 1969).
1971]
KENTucmKY LAW JouRNAL
someone to wash the blood off the truck and threatened to "get"
anyone who told on him. The majority and dissenting opinions
do not differ on the law, only on the interpretation of the facts.
Judge Osborn in his dissent considered that the facts showed a
strong case of extreme carelessness and wanton disregard for
human life and safety. This writer agrees with the dissent. What
one must do in cases is to consider all of the circumstances-
whether the defendant was driving without lights, evidence of
intoxication, failure to stop or yield and the speed at which the
defendant was driving as well as the defendant's actions follow-
ing the accident. Evidence of a defendant's actions and remarks
after a crime may have probative value to show his state of mind
and emotion at the time of the alleged criminal act.8  As Judge
Osborn points out, if he was not wantonly indifferent to the rights
of others, why did he travel while drinking, with his lights out
and at an unreasonable speed on a winding road in semi-darkness?
Why did he leave a dying man on the side of the road? Why did
he threaten to kill anyone who told on him? All of his actions
relative to this accident show a wanton state of mind. The case
indicates how difficult it is to obtain an ultimate conviction, even
when the offense has been lowered to involuntary manslaughter
in the first degree.
At the same term of the Kentucky appellate court, an opposite
result was reached in the case of a woman who had also been
convicted under KRS § 435.022(1)."9 She had made and sold
"heads," a lethal mixture made by mixing a harmless liquid with
paint thinner, to the victim who drank it and died. Examination
of her premises showed several empty cans of the thinner and
there was evidence of several sales of the mixture. The facts of
the case are simple and it is clear that the concoction was ex-
tremely dangerous to human life. The only question then is
whether her act could be considered "wantonly disregardful?"
As in many of the "wantonly disregardful" cases, the defendant
was of low character and was engaged in disreputable activities.
It is much easier to convict such persons of wanton disregard.
Who will raise a voice in their favor?
88 C. McCo~aiC, HANDiBOOKr ON Tm LAW OF EvmErcE 568 (1954).89 Brown v. Commonwealth, 449 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1969).
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But should such an individual be convicted of murder? There
are arguments both pro and con for omitting the negligent murder
from a homicide statute. To omit the crime and punish such
homicides as involuntary manslaughter in the first degree would
not change existing Kentucky law. It is believed that entirely
deleting it is more in accord with practicalities and with present
tendencies toward further humaneness in the law. More and more
juries and courts believe that murder is too harsh a penalty for
such cases, even in situations of extreme negligence. While such
killings are reprehensible, they are unintended-and that seems
to be the decisive factor."
2. Involuntary Manslaughter in the Second Degree
Thirty-five years ago there were no clear-cut definitions of
criminal negligence on either the manslaughter or murder level.
Cases frequently enunciated the familiar rule that the negligence
which must be proved in criminal trials was a far higher degree
than that required in a civil suit.' Early cases often used the
word "gross" to describe this greater degree. The word was also
frequently used to describe civil negligence under certain cir-
cumstances but it was not helpful and has long since been dis-
carded in both civil and criminal cases.
The first break in the confusion by the enunciation of a definite,
descriptive and acceptable definition of criminal negligence was
as to negligent manslaughter and came at approximately the same
time in England, Canada, and the United States. The leading
English case is Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions,92 de-
cided in 1937. The key definitive word in that case is "reckless-
ness." Prior to Andrews, the courts had occasionally used the
word in defining criminal negligence, usually in connection with
another word, but that case was one of the first to single it out
as the one most suited to describe the attitude of mind and con-
duct requisite to the crime. The court was specific: "Probably
90 No statutes covering the negligent murder have been found in these nine
states: Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Texas, and
Wyoming. In these jurisdictions the offense is punished as a common law crime
except in those states where common law crimes have been abolished or there is
some statutory limitation, as in Kentucky.
91Marye v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951). See generally R.
PEnKms supra note 55, at 756.
92 [1937] A.C. 576.
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of all the epithets that can be applied 'reckless' most nearly covers
the case.93
In Archbold's Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, the
author collects many cases which support the deduction: "Where
death results as a consequence of a negligent act, it would seem
that to create criminal responsibility the degree of negligence
must be so gross as to amount to recklessness." 4 This statement
was cited with approbation in the Canadian case, Rex v. Gris-
man,95 where it was held that the negligence which merits pun-
ishment in the eyes of the law may be found where a "general
intention to disregard the law is shown or a reckless disregard
of the rights of others." 6 The first half of this definition is worth-
less; the second, embodying "reckless disregard," contains the
accurate, descriptive phrase then beginning its early development.
American courts have also accepted the word "reckless," elimi-
nating less accurate descriptive terms. In Commonwealth v. Gil97
an attempt was made to clarify the kind of negligent conduct
which gives rise to criminal liability. The defendant was charged
with involuntary manslaughter occasioned by negligent driving.
The trial court instructed that the slightest negligence was suf-
ficient to sustain a conviction. The appellate court reversed the
conviction, saying that more than ordinary negligence is required;
a higher degree is necessary. The court said: "Carelessness or
negligence resulting in death in order to be indictable as involun-
tary manslaughter, must have present in it an element of reck-
lessness."9s
American text writers and commentators such as Perkins,"
Wharton, 00 Berry' 0' and Harno'°2 uniformly use "recklessness"
as the key word in describing criminal negligence on the man-
93 Id. at 583.9 4 J. AIRCEBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE fN CnnUnNAL CASES 903
(30th ed. 1938).
95 [1926] 2 D.L.R. 738.
96 Id. at 743.
97 120 Pa. Super. 22, 182 A. 103 (1935).
98 Id. at 108.
99 ... despite an unfortunate lack of uniformity in expressing the idea,
there is a tendency to speak of the types of behavior amounting to crimi-
nal negligence in terms of 'reckless conduct or 'recklessness.' R. PsauNs,
supra note 55, at 73.
1 bR. WHARTON, Tm LAW OF HoMICIE § 353 (3rd ed. 1907).
101 C. BERRY, THE LAW oF AuTromoBns 1293 (5th ed. 1926).
10242 JR. Cnni. L. C. & P. S. 430, n. 12 (1951).
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slaughter level. And, the Model Penal Code uses the one word
"recklessly" to describe the attitude of mind and conduct requisite
for the negligent homicide on the manslaughter level. 0 3
While "recklessness" is the word most used to describe crimi-
nal negligence on the manslaughter level, it nevertheless must be
admitted that it is still often linked with another word, such as
carelessness, to define the offense. This is due to the fact that the
description is an illustration of the prolixity in the law-never use
one word to describe a legal concept, use three or four, then each
will bolster the others.
0 4
If, then, "recklessness" is selected as the one word most ac-
curately describing the attitude of mind and conduct requisite
for criminal negligence on the manslaughter level, it is important
that one using the term have an understanding of the meaning
of the word. Here there is still an element of uncertainty. It is
difficult to find or frame a wholly satisfactory definition of the
word itself. The Model Penal Code has a description in the phrase,
".conscious disregard of substantial and unjustifiable risk." 05 Two
problems exist in this definition.
First, it is difficult to distinguish between "disregard of sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk" and the tort standard of negligence
as 'lack of the care that a reasonable man would exercise under
the circumstances." Admittedly, it is often difficult to determine
when carelessness has passed the point of lack of the care a
reasonable man would take and crossed the threshold of "disre-
gard of substantial and unjustifiable risk." The torts criterion is
much easier to understand and apply by juries and judges. So,
cognizance of the ambiguity of the current Model Code definition
of "recklessness" leads one to an appreciation of the fact that as
time passes the courts must further refine and clarify its meaning.
Yet, it is a matter of great progress that presently the word "reck-
lessly" has been chosen as the specific term in use to describe
negligence on the manslaughter level.'0 6 The use of this one word
103 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3(1)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
104 The writer is reminded of the attorney under whom he served as a
lav clerk. In a suit for specific performance of a contract, for example, he always
alleged that the plaintiff had always been "ready, willing, eager, and desirous" of
performing.




to describe the requisite quality of mind and conduct and the
elimination of all other loose words which manifestly are not ac-
curate will in time result in further specificity of the definition.'
The other problem in the definition of "recklessness" in the
Model Penal Code is the use of the phrase "conscious" in the defi-
nition. This presents squarely the question: is criminal negli-
gence on the manslaughter level subjective or objective? This
question, probably the one which has occasioned more difficulty
and difference of opinion than any other in the field of criminal
negligence on all levels, is currently being widely discussed by
the commentators. A considerable part of the discussion has been
generated by Glanville Williams who distinguishes between "ad-
vertent" and "inadvertent" negligence.0 s For criminal negligence,
according to Williams, advertent negligence is a prerequisite.' 9
This writer does not consider the words too well chosen; both are
somewhat ambiguous and neither appears common in the law.
For advertent negligence to obtain, the actor must be "aware" of
the reasonable risk he is creating. This writer much prefers to
examine the problem under the usual labels of subjective or
objective negligence.
At least three well-known writers in this field, Mueller, Col-
lings, and Perkins, have examined the problem recently in con-
siderable detail, all citing Williams in their discussions. Mueller
follows the historic view that there can be no criminal liability
without mens tea and that consequently there should be no guilt
in the case of inadvertent negligence."0 He insists on using the
word "inadvertent" following Williams' labels, instead of employ-
ing the objective-subjective classification. However, Mueller
admits that some American cases follow the objective view, even
on the murder level. It is his position that in America there is no
liability for unconscious negligence except where "severe dis-
asters" arouse public opinion, citing Commonwealth v. Welansky,
'07 Contra, Mueller, The Devil May Care-Or Should We? A Reexamination
of Criminal Negligence, 55 Ky. L.J. 29 (1966). "Any attempted explanation of
the degree of negligence would be in vain. There is no thermometer of negligence,
and no co pass can measure its degrees. The difference between the criminal
and the civil measure of negligence is that between an undifferentiated plus and
minus." Id. at 32.
108G. Wmui rs, CRImINAL LAw § 24 (2d ed. 1961).
109 G. WLLIAMs, supra note 108 at § 24; C. KEuuy, OurLuF oF CIinmAL
LAW §§ 22-25 (19th ed. by Turner, 1966).
110 Mueller, supra note 33, at 47.
[VOL 59
LAw OF HoMIaCm
the Coconut Grove disaster."1 Collings, who attempts to think
his way through the cases and texts, apparently is best satisfied
with the Model Penal Code's definition of "recklessness"" 2 which
requires "awareness." However, he points out that there are both
cases and texts which apply the object standard on both the
murder and manslaughter levels." 3 The position of Jerome Hall,
a brilliant although occasionally reactionary thinker, is that "reck-
lessness" requires awareness, but that the jury may find awareness
if they conclude that a reasonable man would have been aware
under the circumstances." 4
At first blush the Model Code seems to state the subjective
requirement of awareness in one sentence and the objective
standard in the following sentence. The Code provides:
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly... when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk .... The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that considering the nature and purpose
of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him,
its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation."n
Why does not the Model Penal Code frankly use the phrase,
"reasonable man," instead of the phrase "law abiding person," a
phrase not used in the cases? Why coin a new phrase which must
await judicial definition? Both Jerome Hall and the Model Code
are using the reasonable man, not as a standard, but as a pro-
cedural device for determining awareness. The use of this device
in this way is partly the reason that the courts are moving per-
ceptively and somewhat rapidly towards a frank acceptance of
the objective view of negligence on the criminal side on all levels.
By far the most accurate, clear, and rational statements as to
the nature of criminal negligence appear in Perkins' Criminal Law.
Speaking of criminal negligence he states:
111 316 Mass. 383, -, 55 N.E.2d 902 910 (1944).
112 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (Proposed Off. Draft, May 3, 1962).
113 Colings, supra note 37.
114J. HALL, GENERAL PmUNCiPLrs OF CRmIINAL LAw, 120, 121 (2d ed.
1960). See Mueller, supra note 33, at 34.
115 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (Proposed Off. Draft, May 24, 1962).
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Some have urged that awareness should be requisite for crimi-
nal negligence but this is not the position taken by the com-
mon law. Whether negligence is criminal or ordinary (slight)
depends not upon the element of awareness but upon the de-
gree of the negligence. If harm has resulted from a failure to
use the degree which the ordinary reasonable man would have
employed under the circumstances, it has resulted from negli-
gence; but it was not criminal negligence unless the conduct
fell far short of measuring up to the standard. Whereas the
civil law requires conformity to the standard there has been
no criminal negligence without a 'gross' deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
under the actor's circumstances.' 6
This quotation states the position of this writer. It leads to this
statement: civil and criminal negligence are the same in kind;
they differ only degree."
7
Perkins faces the subjective-objective problem squarely in a
subsequent study of "recklessness." Again he points out that al-
though Williams and Hall require "awareness" of the danger,
"judicial use of the term has usually not included such a require-
ment."" 8 Perkins is exactly right; a subjective requirement of
awareness on the manslaughter level is almost wholly the creature
of the commentators, not the cases. Perkins points out that the
Model Penal Code employs "recklessness" and "negligence" as
mutually exclusive terms but in the Restatement of Torts," 9 re-
flecting existing judicial usage, no element of awareness is in-
cluded."2 ° Some commentators in requiring awareness have
reached an illogical result in the negligence concept making
negligence necessarily subjective on the manslaughter level.
Why not frankly use the objective criterion of the "reasonable
man" as the standard on the criminal side as well as on the civil?
The standard would be the same on both, the only problem
being to describe the greater degree of negligence required on
the criminal side, and it would indeed be true that civil and
116 R. PEnXmIs, supra note 55, at 72 (emphasis added).
117 Nail v. State, 33 Okla. Grim. 100, 106, 242 P. 270, 272 (1925).
I'sR. PEnmaNs, CrantNAL LA W 760-61 (2d ed. 1969).
119 RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) or ToRTs § 500 (1965).
120 "The difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only
such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a difference in the
degree of the risk, but this difference of degree is so marked as to amount sub-
stantially to a difference in kind." Id. at comment g.
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criminal negligence would be the same in kind, differing only in
degree. The greatest advance in the law of negligence on the
civil side occurred when the objective "reasonable man" was
adopted as the criterion in civil negligence. 121
The supposed requirement that it be subjective on the
criminal side is because of the problem of mens rea. But, as Per-
kins points out, the word "negligence" has been commonly em-
ployed by the criminal courts, "whether the unreasonable risk
was created advertently or inadvertently."'22 The courts, with
few exceptions, do not speak specifically of mens rea. When they
do, they ordinarily use the reasonable man as a procedural device,
in order to determine its existence. And it is true in most cases
that if a reasonable man would have recognized the danger, the
defendant saw it, unless he fell below the standard of a reasonable
man. For example, infants have a lower standard,123 physicians
and surgeons have a higher standard. 4 The law also takes into
consideration unusual physical characteristics in individuals. For
example, an individual who is blind is judged by the reasonable-
man standard but the fact that he is blind is "a part of the circum-
stances." 25 On the other hand the law makes no allowance for
those of less than normal intelligence unless they are insane. 126
Mueller makes much of these variations in the standard of the
"reasonable man," thinking that they illustrate not only the flexi-
bility of the law but a result of subjective justice of unusual
individuals. 2 ' Perhaps, as Mueller suggests, further categoriza-
tion of groups above or below the standard of the reasonable man
would result in further refinement in the standard and further
justice in a quasi-subjective way.
If the suggestions herein were followed and criminal negli-
gence on the manslaughter level were frankly made objective,
there would be little change in the actual results in the law as now
applied. An increasing number of cases and texts already employ
the objective standard. Moreover, the increasing tendency to use
121 First mentioned in Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing., N.C. 368, 132 Eng. Rep.
490 (1738).
12 2 R. PERmamS, supra note 55, at 761.
123 MonrELAND 143.
124 Id. at 151.
125 Id. at 157.
126 Id. at 160.
127 Mueller, supra note 33, at 44.
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the reasonable man as a procedural device to determine aware-
ness is hocus pocus reaching the same result that would be reached
if the objective man were frankly used as the standard.
If this change were made, little change need be made in the
description of the crimes herein discussed. For the negligent
manslaughter the definition then might well be:
Any person who causes the death of a human being by reck-
less disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of danger
to human life and safety under the circumstances, according
to the standard of a reasonable man, shall be guilty of invol-
untary manslaughter .... 128
Similarly, an objective negligent murder statute (or negligent
manslaughter in the first degree statute if the crime is reduced)
might read:
Any person causing the death of a human being by an act
creating such a very high risk of death or serious bodily harm
as to indicate under the circumstances extreme indifference
to the value of human life, according to the standard of a
reasonable man, shall be guilty of .... 129
To make criminal negligence objective would not create liabil-
ity without fault. This writer is no advocate of liability without
fault, but a negligent act is a faulted act. Negligence itself is a
"blameworthy state of mind," and satisfies any reasonable, modem
conception of mens rea. It is the cases of so-called "inadvertent
negligence" that cause difficulties, because at the time of the
killing the defendant may not have had realization of the danger.
But that does not mean that he was not criminally negligent. Hall
mentions several of these situations:
If... one who is about to drive an automobile knows that he
is ill or very tired or if he drinks alcoholic beverage knowing
this will incapacitate him, subsequent damage may ... be
attributed to the immediately prior conduct .... [I]t is tenable
... that he was reckless, not merely negligent .... So, too, a
128 The suggested statute is a combination of IKRS § 435.022(2) (1962) and
the definition of recklessly in the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (Proposed Off.
Draft, 1962). This writer is not satisfied with this definition of recklessly but is
unable to provide a better one at this time. That is grist for tomorrow's mill.
129 This suggested statute is a combination of KRS § 435.002(1) (1962) and
the Second Alternative Negligent Murder Statute, in the text, supra, in this study.
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railroad guard, who knows he has not read recently issued
regulations concerning his work.
130
Hall is bothered by the fact that in such cases the homicidal
act is non-voluntary. But an act need not be voluntary to be
criminal. Three of the four situations Stephen categorized in his
celebrated analysis of common law murder are unintentional. 13 1
One who takes several drinks and drives an automobile, or drives
knowing he has not had enough sleep, or knows he is responsible
for intricate railroad instrumentalities and fails to read regulations,
has been criminally negligent if a homicide is caused thereby.
His act is reckless in most of these cases. Indeed, it may even be
so extremely careless as to indicate under the circumstances the
extreme indifference requisite for murder. Hall in his analysis
of so-called inadvertent negligence cases has failed to take ac-
count of at least two factors important in criminal negligence:
(1) the importance of the instrumentality in use and (2) the
importance of other circumstances in determining negligence on
all levels, civil and criminal. It is submitted that in inadvertent
negligence cases, advertent negligence exists in the background
under this type of analysis. There may be rare exceptions, but
they are so rare that it is almost impossible to hypothecate such a
situation.
Hall is so extreme in his hypothesis that negligence should
never be criminal'3 2 that he brushes aside the history of several
hundred years and the realities of situations such as these. Hall
and Holmes are as far apart as the poles! Holmes appreciates
the fact that an individual should be criminally responsible for
negligent conduct that is deeply injurious to the community. If
a reasonable man in the community would consider the act, or
omission to act where there was a duty to do so, to be extremely
community-dangerous, Holmes would hold the actor criminally
liable if a death occurred thereby133 Hall, on the other hand,
130 Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded From Penal Liability, 63
CoLuM. L. REv. 632, 634 (1963).
131 J. STEPHEN, supra note 3, at 80-81.
132See, e.g., Hall, supra note 130.
1330 Ho.y s, supra note 19 at 55-56. whe Holmes never had the oppor-
tunity to pass upon the question rectly in any case, he incorporated his view as
dictum in a number of cases. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178
(1884) and the discussion and citations to opinions by Holmes, MoRELAND 37.
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fanatically devoted to a narrow, non-realistic conception of mens
rea, is so interested in the mental element behind acts that he
disregards community danger and dangerous conduct. But Hall
is gradually losing his battle, the law is moving perceptively
toward the Holmes objective position, as one who reads current
cases and commentators discovers.
This writer does not wish to labor the following fairly small
matter, but the criminal law, in total disregard of mens rea, has
long punished the individual who contrary to community stan-
dards refuses, for religious reasons, to provide medical care for
his sick child, and death occurs. Suppose that a father has a very
sick child but refuses to call in a doctor because he is very religious
and believes in the efficacy of prayer. Let it be understood that
the father is sincere and is doing what he subjectively believes
to be best for his child. Nevertheless, the father is guilty of a
criminal homicide if the child dies because he did not have medi-
cal attention. Admittedly, these cases are somewhat of an
anomaly in the law, but they do exist in considerable numbers
and represent what is wholly an objective standard.13
4
The Reporters who framed the chapter on Homicide in the
Model Penal Code were unduly impressed by the writings and
opinions of Hall. Hall, unlike the cases and unlike most com-
mentators, takes the position that no negligence should be crimi-
nal. The Model Code also takes that position as to negligence
on the very lowest level in an offense the Code calls Negligent
Homicide.'35 The Model Code and Hall insist that the recklessness
required for manslaughter and for murder require an awareness.
This is not supported by Holmes, by current English cases, 36 by a
number of American cases, nor by many commentators. In the
Code's definition of recklessness 3 7 the procedural device of the
reasonable man is used to make out the subjectivity of awareness;
but this device, also used in many cases, is really a use of the
objective standard in two steps, as argued above. In addition, the
Code's definition of murder, built on "recklessness," the same word
'34 The father is held to the objective standard of the community in such cases.
See the cases and comments in the footnote, MonELAN 127 n. 88 (1952).
135 MODE_ PENAL CODE § 210.4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
136 Id. at comment.
137 MODEL PENAL CODE: § 2.02(2) (c) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
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used in the description of manslaughter, is difficult of applica-
tion.13
8
C. Criminal Negligence In The Operation Of A Motor Vehicle-
"Negligent Homicide," In The Model Penal Code
A high percentage of homicides are committed by the negli-
gent operation of automobiles. In 1957, for example, there were
an estimated 5,740 manslaughters by negligence, of which per-
haps 99% involved automobiles. 139 And yet it has been notori-
ously difficult to convict the negligent motorist of involuntary
manslaughter. Several reasons have brought about this situation.
First, juries are loath to place the harsh label of manslaughter on
a defendant in such cases. Secondly, involuntary manslaughter is
a very serious offense, with a severe penalty of imprisonment and
fine, too harsh juries generally feel for an unintentional killing
under such circumstances. Finally, jurymen all drive cars and
realize that they too are negligent on occasion, so they are apt
to be somewhat lenient as to the penalty. They, too, may some
day be in the dock charged with a similar offense.
Consequently, a number of states chose the expedient of
creating a new substantive crime by legislation, with a new name
and a lesser penalty to alleviate the situation. The first and still
the best article on this new legislation is a study by Stefan Biesen-
feld, published in 1936.140 In that article he points out that
Michigan promulgated the first of such statutes. 141 Other states
followed suit, until such legislation became quite common. 42 The
Michigan statute provided that the offense should be included
within every charge of manslaughter. This gave the jury an
opportunity to convict of the lesser offense if they did not desire
to convict of ordinary manslaughter. Negligent homicide was
defined as driving in a "careless, reckless, or negligent manner,"
poor descriptive adjectives in the light of later statutes in other
jurisdictions. The punishment provided was a $1,000 fine, or five
years imprisonment, or both.
138 See the criticism of Mueller, Where Murder Begins, 2 N.H.B.J. 214 (1960).
139 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comments at p. 53 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
140 Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide-A Study In Statutory Interpretation, 25
CALiU. L. REv. 1 (1936-1937).
141 See the Michigan statute, MoRELAND 246 (1952).
142 Riesenfeld, supra note 140, has an Appendix analyzing such statutes.
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The Kentucky Negligent Homicide In The Operation of An
Automobile Statute, KRS § 435.025, was the outgrowth of the
Court of Appeals decision in Mayre v. Commonwealth,143 re-
versing a conviction of involuntary manslaughter based upon
ordinary negligence, and ruling that nothing less than gross negli-
gence could suffice for criminal liability. Gross negligence was
defined in the opinion as "the failure to exercise slight care."
This definition was severely criticized. It was the consensus of
opinion that under such a definition of criminal negligence it
would be practically impossible to secure a conviction of involun-
tary manslaughter. An editorial in a Lexington newspaper stated
that "slight care in the operation of an automobile is practically
no care at all!" A Kentucky Statute, subsequently enacted, pro-
vides:
Any person who, by negligent operation of a motor vehicle,
causes the death of another, under circumstances not other-
wise punishable as a homicide, shall be imprisoned in the
county jail for not more than one year. 44
This statute satisfies the purpose of such automobile legislation
in that it provides an offense less than ordinary involuntary man-
slaughter for the offense; not using the manslaughter label at all,
and has a punishment of only one year imprisonment in the county
jail. However, the use of the word "negligent" to define the offense
is ambiguous in that the word does not indicate the degree of
negligence required for the offense. After a certain amount of
uncertainty, the Court of Appeals determined that ordinary negli-
gence was sufficient for liability.14' Thus one may be liable both
civilly and criminally for the same negligent act under this statute.
As might be expected in the case of such new and perhaps
transitional legislation, these statutes differ in their detail in the
various states. For example, words and phrases describing the
negligence required for liability under such legislation include:
"gross negligence," "reckless, willful or wanton disregard of the
safety of others," "negligent operation of a motor vehicle," "reck-
less disregard for the safety of others," "careless, reckless or negli-
143 240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
1
44 KRS § 435.025 (1952).
145 Kelly v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 536 (Ky. 1954).
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gent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly," "culpable negli-
gence," "without due caution and circumspection," "a higher
degree of negligence than required for civil liability," "wilful,
wanton and reckless conduct," "the act as a consequence of which
death occurs must be unlawful; no degree of negligence is
required," and "the degree need be no more than ordinary negli-
gence."140 A casual inspection indicates not only the diversity
of such descriptions in the various states, but also the fact that
some of them show a rank ignorance in the whole area of criminal
negligence generally. They illustrate the vast ambiguity and
error often found in new and novel legislation and decisions based
thereon.
Occasionally such statutes have been extended to negligent
homicides in the operation of motor vehicles other than auto-
mobiles. For example, such legislation has been held to cover
negligent homicide in the operation of a motor-boat. The original
plan of such legislation was in part, if not largely, to remove the
label of manslaughter. The Model Code has created a new offense
which is a degree less than manslaughter in the second degree.
47
In other words, the new offense is still a felony, although a lesser
felony than manslaughter. The Model Penal Code provision also
broadens such legislation to include all other negligent homicides
caused by "gross" negligence as well as those in the operation
of an automobile. Thus, the new Model Code provision not only
covers the old series of automobile cases, but also moves on to
cover all other unintentional homicides not committed "reck-
lessly" or "recklessly with extreme indifference, but with aware-
ness." The net result of such a provision is to cause the current
series of statutes called "negligent homicide in the operation of an
automobile" to have the effect of "transitional legislation." The
additional Negligent Homicide provision also does not necessarily
require "awareness;" the act may not be inadvertent. This new
section (201.4) is the only provision of the Model Code embracing
homicide which codifies criminal negligence as such. But the
framers of the Model Code are unwilling to do away with their
140 See fliesenfeld, supra note 140, for an analysis of these statutes in the
Appendix to the article. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comments (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959).
147 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
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requisite of subjective "awareness,"'48 As suggested above, if
the objective reasonable man test were permitted on this level
of negligence (and the requisite of mens rea thus satisfied) it
would appear that, at least as a matter of theory, mens rea should
be satisfied under the objective test in the higher (manslaughter
and murder) provisions of the Model Code. 49
While general approval is in order for section 210.4 of the
Model Code, there are several features of the section which could
readily be improved. The definition of "negligently" in the Model
Code is woefully ambiguous. There are two elements in the
definition: (1) the actor should "perceive" a "substantial and
unjustifiable risk," and (2) the act must involve a "gross deviation"
from the standard of care of a reasonable person.1 0 The same two
elements plus "awareness" appear in the Model Code definition of
"recklessly."' 5' Admittedly, the drafting of a comprehensive defini-
tion of negligence is difficult, but that does not change the fact
that both these elements are vague and ambiguous. What is a
"substantial and unjustifiable risk?" That is for the jury to decide.
Perhaps, but reasonable men may differ greatly in applying the
terms to the circumstances of particular cases on two negligence
levels. Secondly, the word "gross" has been kicked around in the
civil and criminal law for over a hundred years without a con-
sistent definition ever being arrived at by the courts. For example,
the definition of the Kentucky Court of Appeals of "gross negli-
gence" as "want of slight care"' is illustrative of the ambiguity
of the word. The phrase "substantial and unjustifiable risk" is also
badly ambiguous and the word "gross" on both the civil and
criminal sides has been found so indefinite and uncertain that it
has been practically abandoned.
Is the new "Criminal Negligence" provision in the Model
Penal Code a broadening of the "Homicide In The Operation Of
An Automobile" statutes or is it an independent approach to the
entire criminal negligence problem based largely on the elements
of "awareness" and "unawareness?" This writer believes it is the
148 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
149 See Hart, The Aims of The Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTENT,. PROB. 401,
416-17 and especially the Conclusion in italics at 440-41 (1948).
150 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (Proposed Off. Draft 1962).
151 See also n. 148.
152 Kelly v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 536 (Ky. 1964).
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latter, a new fundamental approach to the whole negligence prob-
lem which has gone off almost wholly on a distinction between
awareness and unawareness. It is true the Model Code uses the
reasonable man standard, as do many cases, as a procedural device
to permit the jury to determine awareness, and using the reason-
able man as a procedural device to make out subjectivity may well
be a transitional move toward objectivity; but, as a matter of
theory, objectivity has not yet arrived in the Model Code. As for
the automobile cases, it is submitted that they are absorbed in the
new general provision on "Negligent Homicide."
It is with such dissatisfactions with the definitions of negli-
gence in the Model Penal Code in mind that an attempt will now
be made to draft a statute on the lowest level of criminal negli-
gence that will be more clear and unambiguous. Such a statute
might well read:
Where an accused person is guilty of a homicide arising out
of a dangerous act of more than ordinary negligence under
the circumstances, but less than recklessness, according to the
standard of a reasonable man, he is guilty of Negligent
Homicide.
The decisive elements of this definition are clear and well-
established. The definition of ordinary negligence is well-known
-one is liable for ordinary (civil) negligence when he fails to use
the care that a reasonable man should use under the circum-
stances.03 If his carelessness is not of that high a degree, he is
not liable at all. If his negligence is of a higher degree than
ordinary negligence, it is criminal negligence. The line between
these two degrees of negligence plots the line between civil negli-
gence and criminal negligence of the lowest degree. It is true
that the test for civil negligence is worded generally and broadly,
but juries and judges have had no great trouble applying it to
specific cases. It has been almost above criticism by lawyers
and the courts.
Similarly, when criminal negligence on the lowest level
crosses the line into recklessness on its upper level, the accused
is guilty of manslaughter. The line between criminal negligence
153 W. Pnossm%, LAw OF ToRTs 153 (3d ed. 1964).
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on the lowest level and recklessness on the higher one marks the
decisive point between these two degrees of negligence.
This definition of criminal negligence on the lowest level may
be shown by a graph as follows:
CIVIL NEGLIGENCE-CRIMINAL NEGLIGECE ON LOwEST LEVEW 
'
A. Ordinary or Civil Negligence B. Lowest Degree of Criminal Neg-
ligence
Less care than a reasonable man would A higher degree than ordinary negli-
use under the circumstances. gence is required.
(Objective Standard of Care). (Objective Standard of Care).
A> B >(and beyond)
The degree of negligence increases in this direction from A
to B (and beyond).
Where there were formerly three degrees of negligence (1)
ordinary negligence (civil), (2) the negligence requisite for
manslaughter and (3) the negligence required for murder, there
are now four degrees. The Model Penal Code has added an
additional degree, to come between ordinary negligence and the
negligence required for manslaughter in the third degree. This
naturally increases the difficulty in drawing definitions for the
various degrees of criminal negligence.
Various propositions have been argued pro and con in this
paper. In order that the reader may see with more particularity,
the ultimate suggestions the writer has in mind, the following
rough draft is presented:





Any person who commits wilful murder shall be pun-
ished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for a
minimum of fifteen years before becoming eligible for
parole.
Voluntary Manslaughter.
(1) An unlawful homicide, which would otherwise
be wilful (intentional) murder shall constitute voluntary
manslaughter when:
(a) committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is
reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonable-
ness of such explanation or excuse shall be deter-
mined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be.
(b) the person who committed the killing or
was a party to it was at the time so intoxicated as to
be unable to form the wilfulness (intent) requisite
for murder.
(c) the person who committed the killing or was
a party to it was at the time of the crime, although
not legally insane, suffering from such mental disease
or defect as to substantially impair his mental re-
sponsibility for his acts or omissions in doing or
being a party to the killing.
(2) Any person who commits voluntary manslaugh-
ter shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than
two nor more than twenty-one years.
Involuntary Manslaughter In The First Degree.
Any person who causes the death of a human being
by an act creating such a very high risk of death or seri-
ous bodily harm as to indicate under the circumstances
extreme indifference to the value of human life, shall be
confined in the penitentiary for not less than one year
1971]
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nor more than fifteen years.' 5' (Term of punishment
purely suggestive.)
Involuntary Manslaughter In The Second Degree.
Any person who causes the death of a human being
by reckless disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of danger to human life and safety under the circum-
stances, according to the standard of a reasonable man,
shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the second
degree and... (Punishment optional).
Criminal Negligence.
Where an accused person is guilty of a homicide aris-
ing out of a dangerous act of more than ordinary negli-
gence under the circumstances, but less than reckless-
ness, according to the standard of a reasonable man, he
is guilty of Negligent Homicide.
155 This is the negligent murder reduced to involuntary manslaughter in the
first degree, as a matter of social policy. Three statutes with different wordings are
suggested in the paper in the section devoted to the negligent murder. This is the
second alternative statute suggested.
